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Abstract The Seven Sisters states are a region in the North-eastern India frontier comprising the 
states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. After 
the 1962 Sino-Indian war, China raised territorial claims on this wild region, rich in resources and 
featured by a strategic position. If China considers those areas be part of the national territory, due 
to an ethno-linguistic continuity of some people who live there, nevertheless the backbone of the 
region consists of an environment dense of historical and cultural elements that belong to India 
and, indeed, that go beyond its boundaries. 
Today’s ideological quarrel between the two Asian powers on the dorsal 
border of the eastern Himalayan clashes with the collective imagination 
of the Asian Century, where China and India are leading the markets and 
are potentially able to dictate the agenda of global development. Huge 
economic interests – the achievements of years of bilateral agreements 
and international trades – seems to be challenged by territorial claims over 
a still very problematic area in which critical issues, such as the so-called 
‘low-intensity’ conflicts, are not yet resolved. 
Separated by the rest of the Subcontinent by the Bangladeshi border, the 
North-eastern frontier has suffered for decades a condition of administra-
tive isolation from the rest of India, with particular reference to a chronic 
lack of development planning. A region historically subject to inner tribal 
wars, the Seven Sisters host a number of separatist ethnic movements. The 
ethnical and cultural identity of indigenous minority groups has been often 
used to foster such pushes. Yet despite the exploitative nature of such ef-
forts, indigenous tribes have managed to remain among the most important 
repositories of the local ancestral cultural heritage. 
Our analysis consists in a comparison between historical studies on the 
region and the data collected during a two-years field research among the 
tribal communities of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The analysis suggests 
that the dialogue with minorities, as well as the adoption of measures to pro-
tect the cultural heritage of the area and to foster a path of ecologically sus-
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tainable development could be a possible key for the normalization process 
of the area. It is indeed a policy that – in a historical perspective – could be 
pursued more effectively by Indian authorities than from any other country. 
Moreover, just as during the Second World War, with the making of the 
new global order, the region played a major role due to its strategic im-
portance, I argue how today – at the dawning of the Asian Century – this 
will be one of the most relevant focuses for the balance of the South Asian 
quadrant. 
1 Introduction
The North-eastern border of India, known as the Seven Sisters, is com-
posed by the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. Despite the geographical-territorial pe-
culiarities of each region, it is possible to outline the common characteris-
tics to the entire North-east area. While we note the valuable specificities, 
such as a rich cultural heritage and an abundance of resources, there are 
other critical issues – such as isolation, lack of infrastructural develop-
ment, the presence of centrifugal forces – the resolution of which will be 
the key to the future of India and its equilibrium with the surrounding 
countries. Since my fieldwork took place mainly in Arunachal Pradesh and 
Assam, I will principally refer to the problems of these two States in order 
to draw a valid paradigm, at least on a theoretical level, for the border 
policies of the whole area.
I analyse the case of the recent Chinese claims of approximately 90,000 
square kilometres of Indian territory which would include, therefore, the 
whole Arunachal Pradesh (83,743 sq. km). The question is, in our view, 
serious and delicate as it threatens to plunge the fragile regional balance 
and trigger a controversial scenario in the South Asian quadrant. 
According to an historical approach, the origins of the so-called carto-
graphic dispute between China and India ground their roots in the colonial 
context. In 1913-1914 was traced the famous McMahon line that more than 
an ancient Indian frontier, was rather a new border that replaced the previ-
ous boundary defined by the Outer Line. What we found interesting today 
is to note that the effective control and the practice of colonial authority 
of the areas included on the natural Himalayan dorsal – even in terms of 
exploring a wild and often little known territory at that time – focused in 
key periods of the modern history of the Indian subcontinent, in case of 
essentially strategic emergency. The Shimla agreements of 1913-1914, at 
the dawn of the First World War, served to expand the areas of British 
control by creating buffer zones around India and especially to keep China 
away from the rich Assamese plain. Paradoxically, there was a period of 
political and administrative latency in the coming years, followed by a 
Beggiora. Ethnicity and Nationalism on the Northeastern Frontier  175
Annali di Ca’ Foscari, 50, 1 (42), 2014, pp. 173-190 ISSN 1125-3762
 
new increasing interest in the prelude to the Second World War. Then, the 
consolidation of boundaries became extremely relevant, because the area 
could alone spark off a chain reaction that would lead to the collapse of 
British colonial rule in India, something the Japanese invasion via Burma 
and the establishment of the Indian National Army of Bose were actually 
trying to achieve. 
In contemporary times we see how the policies of border security and 
international pressure are accentuate in crucial moments, and both pro-
cesses are taking place in the country, influenced and shaped by global 
processes as well. The policies of the 1950s in fact emerge from the matrix 
of nation-building process: whereas the line of Nehru’s foreign pañcaśīla 
fought hard with the fact that China had never really recognised the valid-
ity of the McMahon line. Hence, the unexpected Sino-Indian War of 1962 
took place. Likewise today, at the dawn of the third millennium, as the 
Asian powers seem to contend among themselves the supremacy to lead 
the global markets, the issue resurfaces with renewed vigour. To be exact, 
we might add in parenthesis that an upsurge took place in 1987 with the 
incident of Sumdorong Chu Valley, only a skirmish between China and In-
dia, shortly forestalling, perhaps not coincidentally, a transition period for 
Indian politics and a change in the global order (the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and its consequences). 
The conflict of 1962, however, creates an important precedent. While 
India was to reclaim the Aksai Chin on the side of Jammu and Kashmir, 
the overwhelming and unexpected advance of the People’s Liberation 
Army along the eastern ancient pilgrimage route to Lhasa, in Arunachal 
Pradesh – and its strategic retreat – have provided the pretext for the 
Chinese to claim not only on the disputed area of Tawang, but the whole 
region. But if for a moment we disregard the mere border issues or the 
military closely-related matters we will notice that the two Asian pow-
ers have no conflicts of interest substantially insoluble. Indeed, as stated 
Subramanian Swami, the tension between the two countries is probably 
dictated by the position of the Indian Government on the issue of Tibet, 
evidently perceived as ambiguous (Chen 2006, pp. 54-101). Not by chance 
that Arunachal Pradesh is defined by the Chinese as Southern Tibet (Sub-
ramanian Swami 2000).1
To conclude this historical introduction, I notice that anywhere in the 
world the post-colonial policies have created ad hoc new boundaries, often 
summarily without taking into account the pre-existing socio-political fab-
ric, for self-interest or in order to accelerate a hasty exit-strategy. So have 
been formed flashpoints of conflict still today unresolved. This is true in 
1 For a Chinese perspective on the issue, I suggest the interesting work of John W. Garver 
(2002; 2006, pp 86-130). 
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Africa, the Middle East, India, where for decades wars have been fought at 
different levels of intensity but that are generally considered hot spots on 
the planet. The most glaring example for India is clearly the Kashmir issue, 
unresolved since the time of Partition. In relation to the Western issue, it is 
interesting to note that after September 11 and the nominal accession of the 
Governments of India and Pakistan in the fight against international terror-
ism, the United States were expected to mediate on the Kashmir issue. At 
that time, A.B. Vajpayee and P. Musharraf demanded the intervention of the 
Bush administration, as well as the Pakistani side until now has been asking 
that of Obama. This mediation, even at the diplomatic level has been always 
denied, considering the Kashmiri issue as a matter of exclusive bilateral 
agreement between India and Pakistan. This choice seems blunder because 
on the one hand – in our opinion – is a refusal to participate in a peace pro-
cess by a nation that has always wanted to rise herself as a leading power 
for the West and as a global model of democracy. Indeed under a strictly 
technical perspective, the so-called Line of Control would be considered de 
facto a diplomatic pact of bilateral nature signed through the 1972 Shimla 
agreement on a previous consensus of non-aggression between two coun-
tries (cease-fire line). On the other hand, the question of the Line of Actual 
Control, or the current China-India border, seems to be different: whereas 
coinciding with the layout of the old McMahon Line, this had to be a tri-
partite cartel never accepted in toto by China (Warikoo 2009). The intrin-
sic fragility of the border seems emphasized by the word ‘Actual’, in fact, 
broken by numerous accidental crossings in recent years. After several 
agreements to reduce tension on the border, the last agreement of 2005 is 
based on a previous exchange of maps between China and India primarily 
aimed at defining the respective perceptions of LAC. Despite the positive 
statements of intent for the future of China-India bilateral relations (Text 
of India-China Agreement, 2005), the cyclic undertow of Chinese claims on 
the northeast returns as a refrain following dynamics of the global order or 
though the international attention moves to the Tibetan issue. In this paper 
we will show how the challenge for India in this case is two-fold: domestic 
politics and international relations. Perhaps the resolution of an aspect of 
the problem entails in itself the solution of the second. 
2 The Century of Asia, geopolitics and economics
In the contemporary international economic profile, while facing the global 
economic crisis on the basis of the life jacket provided by the recent dec-
ades of economic boom, the strongest markets have proved to be Asian. 
In this context, both China and India have asserted their leading role to 
such an extent that the expression ‘the Century of Asia’ has become itself 
almost a cliché. 
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However, this scenario still creates some confusion in the Western hem-
isphere where a ‘Century of Asia’ is perceived as alarming because it 
inherently assumes the contemporary setting of the Western, or rather 
American, Century. The threat of losing the carefully cultivated supremacy 
if only from an economic point of view has generated a sense of insecurity 
in the West that is at times filled with implausible scenarios. In the past 
the categorisation ‘Asia’ has suggested the erroneous idea of a platform 
common to all major Asian powers sharing strategic or at least political and 
economic guidelines. This expedient was trying to foreshadow an ‘alterity’ 
that if not an outright ‘enemy’, in some way confirmed the presence of a 
‘rival’ of the third millennium. As a result, in Italy for example the unfortu-
nate expression ‘Cindia’ (a combination of China and India) gained some 
popularity based on the idea that the two Asian powers were living in a 
cultural continuum, sharing the goal planning. However, nothing could be 
further from the truth. If it is impossible to include the two countries in an 
ethnical, cultural, political, strategic or economic developmental macro-
category except for patterns broadly common to the emerging economies 
(BRIC) – which must be applied, however, in different ways – such con-
siderations can be extended to the whole pan-Asian context. A striking 
example is represented by the guidelines for securing the future energy 
supply in Asia, including the bilateral discussions between India and the 
US aimed at achieving a deal on nuclear energy, the detached attitude of 
China and the failure of the Obama mission on the emission of greenhouse 
gas in Beijing at the end of 2009. 
Conversely, the opposite idea of a rival-East split, intended to be con-
sumed by intestine frictions, may have lulled in an ephemeral way those 
who like to depict apocalyptic war scenarios. 
If it is true that the unprecedented economic growth of China and India 
has substantially raised these countries’ status in the world economy, it is 
equally true that this growth has been accompanied by a rapid expansion 
of bilateral trade between the two largest developing countries (Wu and 
Zhou 2006, pp. 509-518). In 2011-2012, the bilateral trade between China 
and India has reportedly reached a total volume of US $ 75,594.44 mil-
lion, an increase of 28.21% compared to 2010/20112 (See also WTO 2011 
p. 12-44). As further economic reforms will support this growth, a propor-
tional increase of the exchange between the two neighbouring systems is 
expected. Other parameters could implement this trend by adopting an 
economic policy aimed at the exploits and the exchange of each country’s 
comparative advantage following the dynamics of overlapping, recipro-
cal complement – already implemented as training process – between the 
2 Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Dept. of Commerce, updat-
ed 2012-10-10.
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strongest sectors, i.e. the industrial sector in China and the tertiary sector 
(services) in India (Saran, Guo 2005, pp. 135-142). 
Recent studies in economics show that as the two countries have fol-
lowed different lines of economic development leading to diverging rates 
of growth over time (except for the directives aimed at the supply of energy, 
which is one of the priorities of the third millennium) the productive sec-
tors in which there is an effective overlap such as to create rivalry are few. 
It is difficult in this scenario to assume that the two countries would 
be ready to undo what has been built so far. China’s future challenge is 
to deal with the enormous social pressure caused by unemployment and 
underemployment, the solution of which would seem to lie in maintaining a 
relatively high rate of growth. India too aims at accelerating the somewhat 
sluggish pace of its economic development, for instance by improving its 
infrastructure. In either case, the challenges of the future will not likely 
be resolved through an armed conflict (Athwal 2008, p. 5). At the dawn of 
the third millennium, no nation is ready put its wealth at risk by venturing 
into a military conflict for reasons of mere cartographic matter, unless the 
stakes are not higher. 
Illustrative in this sense is an episode dating back to October 29, 2008, 
when the then British foreign minister, David Miliband, declared that af-
ter nearly a century of support for Tibetan autonomy on the part of Great 
Britain, the Government had decided to recognize Tibet as part of the 
People’s Republic of China and even apologized for this not happening 
before (Booker 2010). While the news made the headlines in the newspa-
pers around the world, creating a stir for the dramatic turnabout of Brit-
ish politics, the Indian side perceived it with lightness and a sense of little 
responsibility on the part of who was once a colonial power, in matters of 
international relations and historical succession. To wipe the slate clean, 
the Shimla agreement was labelled as somehow anachronistic and so was 
the McMahon Line, with all the consequences entailed in the yet unre-
solved question of the Northeastern border between India and China. It 
should be remembered that it was on the principles of the Shimla that the 
war of 1962 and the dangerous accident of 1987 took place. Few however 
noted that the declarations by Miliband in the same month of 2008 were 
preceded by the request of Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, to 
China to increase its contributions to the International Monetary Fund, in 
return for which the latter would have seen an increase of the votes in its 
favour in the United Nations (Barnett 2008, A31). 
When I met His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama shortly after the attacks of 
September 11, he noted with regret that international attention would be 
shifted to the ‘new’ emergencies, moving the Tibetan issue to the back-
ground. The US-Western military escalation in Afghanistan and in the 
Middle East, the search for new allies in the international war on terror-
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ism and the policy of no-inference of China in these processes would have 
definitely revealed the world’s oblivion on the open wound of Tibet. The 
fact that this very question has a direct connection with the disputed north-
eastern border became clear when new Chinese territorial claims arrived 
soon after. Well before the episode of the Sumdorong Valley in 1986, the 
Chinese vice foreign minister Liu Shuquing declared that about 90,000 
square kilometers of Chinese territory were under Indian occupation. In 
November 2006 the Chinese ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, asserted Chi-
na’s territorial claim over the entire Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh in 
spite of an agreement between the two countries one year earlier. 
Yet another point in our perspective is the fact that the several times 
deferred Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang district, which took place in 2009 on 
the border, caused great nervousness on the Chinese side. This area is of 
great strategic importance that spreads beyond the defensive Indian line at 
the Se La Pass. It shortly fell into Chinese hands during the conflict in 1962 
but later returned to India administration, this is the first of the disputed 
territories. Historically and culturally a part of Tibet, the important mon-
astery of Tawang was founded in 1681 at the behest of the fifth Dalai Lama 
and the surrounding valley is the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. The 
road connecting Tawang to the Tibetan fortress of Dirang in West Kameng 
was the last outpost of the ancient eastern Buddhist pilgrimage route to 
Lhasa. The closedown on the Western Front of the Aksai Chin adds strate-
gic value to the territory beyond its intrinsic historical and cultural herit-
age. The frequent ‘accidental’ Chinese incursions on through the border 
were undoubtedly intended to reaffirm these territorial claims. 
However, the extent of China’s interest to the whole State are possibly 
dictated by a series of geo-political factors: Arunachal Pradesh represents 
a strategic passage connecting the Brahmaputra valley with Lhasa and the 
Chinese province of Yunnan, thereby allowing China to control the entire 
area. Beyond the State’s potential in the areas of tourism and agriculture it 
is rich in mineral deposits and has large tracts of forest. Finally, control of 
this area would allow China to gain continuity on the eastern side of Bhutan 
while at the same time providing a further road of access to the markets 
of South-East Asia (Liu 1994). 
The issue of hydroelectric resources seems particularly relevant because 
it can become a paradigm of the entire situation of Northeast. China and 
India both depend strongly on the flow of waters downhill from the Tibetan 
region as a resource for drinking water, agriculture, energy production and 
the needs for present and future industrial production. One of the most 
important challenges for the future of Arunachal Pradesh is the so called 
‘riparian issue’. Most rivers of the State have an enormous potential for 
being exploited for producing hydro-power to the tune of 49,126 megawatt 
of electricity (Goswami 2011, p. 10). Arunachal Pradesh has signed memo-
randums of understanding (MoUs) with private groups for the construction 
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of around 103 dams in the State. These projects have sometimes caused 
anxiety among the local population about the indiscriminate use of the 
territory, the fear of seismic instability or flooding during the monsoon 
season. In fact, accidents in Chinese plants across the border are frequent, 
the repercussions of which were felt also in the villages on the Indian side. 
Moreover, almost all rivers that in the region originate and flow through 
Chinese territory before reaching India thus resulting in a certain depend-
ence of the latter on the former: hence, the planning issue in Arunachal 
Pradesh follows the well-known vexed question of the deviation of the 
Yangtze-Brahmaputra on a minor scale. The threat of diversion of river 
water to compensate drought problems in the most remote areas of China 
entails the obvious risk of environmental disaster in North-east India. This 
is because international laws permit any country to use the run-off water 
of any river within its territory, but in the case the river is trans-boundary 
the Customary International Law requires that the interest of the riparian 
states have to be taken into account by ensuring equitable distribution of 
water, leaving a vague definition of how to assess ‘a reasonable share’. 
The riparian issue – since water is one of the most important natural 
resource, but also a fundamental right – is steadily becoming a geopoliti-
cal weapon and an instrument of pressure by Chinese side on the central 
stage of the so-called Seven Sisters scenario. Vice versa the Indian plan-
ning to build dams on Arunachal rivers, and possibly in the neighbouring 
territories, seems to be the key primarily to counter the Chinese claim. 
Is interesting to note that while the West seemed to bow to the Chinese 
power at the dawn of the global economic crisis, in June 2009, for the first 
time ever on a multi-lateral forum, China tried to block India’s request for 
a $2.9 billion loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as it included 
$60 million for flood management, water supply, and a sanitation project in 
Arunachal Pradesh. According to ADB sources China was unhappy at India 
seeking funds for a project in what they termed as ‘disputed territory’. The 
ADB however approved the loan on the grounds that there is no history of 
the ADB deferring a loan to India (Goswami 2011, p. 3). 
3 Nationalism, Ethnicity, Violence, a theoretical approach 
The ethnic variety of the population of the Seven Sisters is perhaps one of 
the most distinctive features of the territory. Further to that, one should al-
so consider the ability of many local communities to preserve their own cul-
tural and linguistic identity. The Hindu socio-cultural background – sound-
ly established in the peninsular part of the Subcontinent – here meets with 
the customs of the descendants of those who, over the centuries, migrated 
from China, Tibet, Burma, Thailand and Southeast Asia. It is generally 
recognised that these people – whom linguistic anthropology taxonomies 
Beggiora. Ethnicity and Nationalism on the Northeastern Frontier  181
Annali di Ca’ Foscari, 50, 1 (42), 2014, pp. 173-190 ISSN 1125-3762
 
as Tibeto-Burma speakers and the Sanskrit literature call Kirata – for-
merly occupied the whole region of the Northeast. On the one hand, some 
communities settled around the valley of the Brahmaputra (e.g. Bodos, 
Garo, Kacharis, Tripuris, Hajongs, etc.). On the other, many communities 
migrated from the north in order to find an area suitable for new villages, 
and they settled into the valleys (e.g. Tani, Adi, Monpa, etc.) (Mibang and 
Behera 2007). 
For historians and anthropologists the Ahom period (1228–1826) is par-
ticularly important because it was possible to establish an administrative 
system holding together several ethnic groups. Also, the patronage of 
Hindu religious institutions favoured the filtration of Brahminical (and 
particularly śakta) elements. Following the practice of divide and impera, 
some groups, potentially clashing with the authority, were fragmented 
and dispersed in different areas of the territory. According to the process 
that was theorised by D.D. Kosambi, such communities were reintegrated 
into the new matrix acting on the mutual recognition of their status and 
their functions within the society (Kosambi 1965). This presupposes a 
certain continuum and permeability between the concepts of tribe and 
caste that here emerge more perceptible here than elsewhere (Chatto-
padhyaya 2002).3
Within this multi-ethnic milieu, vernacular forms of Hinduism were as-
similated thus becoming absorbed in the local variety of tribal traditions 
and ritual practices. The same applies to Buddhism, whose schools, his-
torically present in the valleys, have interpreted in dharmic terms the lo-
cal cultural environment and its enculturation. In this scenario, the long 
shadow casted by the forest or the highest peaks seems to veil the bound-
ary between traditions. While religious traditions and rituals seem inextri-
cably linked, specialist figures like the brahmin, the pūjārī, the lama, the 
oracle and the shaman do recognise each other for authority and charisma 
within their community. Very different realities so often live in constricted 
areas, sometimes in the same village, in a plurality of elements difficult to 
be discovered elsewhere. These special cultural clusters therefore seem to 
conglomerate – cohesive in some way to a sense of continuity with ancient 
traditions – around the focal points of the complex grid of precisely Hindu 
and Buddhist sacred geography. 
This is confirmed by Bhagabati (2009, p. 4) who individuates three stages 
of social transformation, i.e. migration, [cultural] adaptation strategies, 
negotiation of space. Bhagabati notes that the mobility of the hill tribes 
was no doubt originally inspired by the struggle for living spaces. As histo-
ry – and the cosmogonical memory itself of the clans – shows, these groups 
were constantly fighting each other, conflicts of feud take place, so that 
3 A clear example is in Assam the historic integration of different Deori/Chutiya groups. 
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the Ahom themselves in many cases waived to collect taxes but rather they 
paid the bribes of the so-called posa in order to maintain the stability of the 
territories (Singh 1995, p. 14). But migration and subsequent adaptation to 
new homelands – a process that could lead to variables on the names and 
the new identities – were possible under a social context essentially fluid 
and flexible to incorporate new immigrants. 
This kind of micro-equilibrium would be threatened by the radicalisation 
of social boundaries that took place as consequence of colonialism as well 
as some aspects of post-colonial policies. This would cause the onset of 
many centrifugal forces in the actual processes of nation-building in India. 
These, however, are so numerous and complexes that I would not analyse 
them although I will look into their origins. 
In his Imagined Communities (1991), Anderson informs us that the idea 
of the nation as a community socially constructed is imagined by the peo-
ple who perceive themselves as part of this group. In his conclusions, he 
shifts the focus on colonialism. Nationalism in Europe is said to be followed 
by the diffusion of a similar process in colonised countries. In Chapter 7, 
The Last Wave, it would come to the paradox to reconfigure the concept 
of national history in an attempt to shape the consciences in colonial con-
text. The overflow of the so-called ‘last wave’ mould the idea of  the nation 
in a conscious way, by virtue of the fact that the nation-State has become 
a criterion established at the international level. In Chapter 10 (Census, 
Map and Museum), Anderson describes the attempt of the European State-
model of the 19th century to control its domain by counting the population, 
mapping the territory and hegemonising history. People were systemati-
cally classified, catalogued through the instrument of the Census, which 
creates a ‘community dimension’ that is substantially fictitious, because 
imagined, pre-established. Similarly, the attempt to objectify some specific 
natural geographical subdivisions, became functional in the mechanism to 
map the nation, that become the icon, the distinguished logo of national 
movements. The museum, or rather the national monument, which creates 
and maintains a tradition also becomes a symbol immediately recognisable 
and functional in this sense. The serialisation process was also the key ele-
ment of the State’s attempt, also in the overseas colonies, to establish a 
‘totalizing classificatory grid’ (Jaffrelot 2003, p. 12).
On the one hand there is no doubt that all this happened in India too, 
in colonial times due to the British rule. The first great works of Census 
especially aimed at the classification of those minorities regarded as dan-
gerous – not coincidentally after the Mutiny. The perfunctory creation of 
functional boundaries, the presumption of educating Indian subjects, the 
ideological inference on nation-building process can be as well quoted.
The limit of Anderson, as well as the study of Ernest Gellner (1983), is to 
consider the nation and nationalism as a product of modernity, created ad 
hoc for economic-political reasons. In this process the tradition – a matter 
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not to be underestimated in a country whose culture and religion convey 
valuable concepts for the society, in front of the West that seems increas-
ingly weak in this regard – here would result a fictitious expedient useful 
to the cause. India has instead demonstrated its ability to self-keep its 
own traditions, as well as the talent to renovate them at the occurrence, 
without inference from the outside on its largely in past ages achieved rank 
of civilisation. This allows the country to be a place where tradition and 
modernity coexist balanced.
Nevertheless, the analysis of Anderson interprets well what was the 
colonial history of India. If we pass from the country’s general view to the 
particular of the Northeast, the result does not change. The key role of the 
British administration was, once again, the disruption of previous social 
balance and the establishment of new boundaries. The most striking aspect 
was the introduction in 1873 of the Inner line that in addition to bisect the 
region, ideologically created a separation between tribal and non-tribal 
people. In synthesis, can be accepted that this was the beginning of dis-
crimination, sanctioned through a formal separation between the cadastral 
rich areas – the Assamese plains, privileged, protected and exploited – and 
wild areas, that soon reached the status of ‘excluded’ in the Act of 1935. 
The former had to bear socio-economic and administrative measures on 
the cadastral mapping of the region, while in the impossibility to overtax 
the latter otherwise logistic or strategic advantage was taken exploiting 
the local population at the dawn of world conflicts. The biggest fault of 
this period was the raising of new boundaries, freezing a reality that since 
then had been fluid, by its nature. The colonial concept of tribe in turn 
was wrong in imagining a static and closed social structure, whereas since 
then the local communities maintained a code, while complex, of relative 
permeability and sharing alliances and cultural identities. 
To this system that was gradually hardening through the demarcation 
of new borders, the British Raj added the weight of immigration. If the 
Bengali influence was present at the arrival of the British in the area, in 
the early 20th century there was the systematization of the transfer of 
masses of Bengali Hindus who formed the backbone of the colonial ad-
ministration. In a second time will be added to these masses of peasants 
generally Muslims pour into the region in search of new lands. These two 
groups of migrants remained two discrete formations, episodic coalition 
and ethnic block formation out of political expediency notwithstanding 
(Bhagabati 2009, p. 7). Also interesting in an anthropological perspec-
tive, the formation of a common social platform of the ādivāsīs who were 
employed as tea workers: although ethnically different, they got-together 
united in the plantations of Assam. Finally, as a result of colonial policies, I 
can mention the masses of Nepali in search of occupation and a small but 
significant percentage of Marwari and Sindhi and other groups from dif-
ferent parts of India. If these flows have inevitably created tensions with 
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the Assamese and the North-eastern communities, the post-Independence 
policies have someway aggravated the situation. With the partition of East 
Pakistan first and the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 followed an 
economic crisis for the states of the Northeast. The lines of communication 
with the rest of India by road, by rail, or through the waterways, or the in-
land navigation, were rudely interrupted. At the same time, any port access 
was lost. To date the subject is highly topical (Patak 2012, pp. 19-23): the 
region has faced a steady stream of irregular migrants in search of work 
from the border with Bangladesh. Something similar happened apropos of 
the Tibetan question. After granting asylum state to His Holiness the 14th 
Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, many Tibetan communities, also on the eastern 
side, have over time settled as refugees. In synthesis, the role played by 
the Indian Government in international politics, while legitimate and justi-
fied in a South-Asian regional context, in the first as well as in the second 
case produced the side-effect of social pressure of immigration. In both 
cases, this social pressure has been charged to the Northeast, and I think 
this is the perception of the problem from the Seven Sisters perspective.4 
But since the North-eastern frontier has suffered for decades a condition 
of administrative isolation from the rest of India, with particular reference 
to a chronic lack of development planning, the local groups are not willing 
to bear, or to cope alone with such a pressure. 
In this contest it is experienced the overlap of both forms of migration 
that Robin Cohen suggested in his Global Diasporas (1997, p. 78), or those 
produced by empires, colonial policies or consequential ethnic boundaries, 
and those related to the features, necessities or the research itself of the 
occupation. Despite the protean nature of the communities in the North-
east, nowadays two opposing factions are taking shape primarily through-
out the region: insiders and outsiders facing each other in competition for 
living space, resources, employments. As an example I would remember to 
have seen several times in Arunachal Pradesh writings on the walls of the 
houses in some villages: Tibetans go home. The phrase mainly strikes the 
stranger because it clashes in every way with an imaginary consolidated 
over the past decades: India welcomes the Tibetan refugees, the Tibetans 
are a friendly and peaceful people. Last but not least, the phrase is not 
written in Hindi, Assamese and Tibetan but in English: an international 
message. Here it is how, a slogan written on a wall is in turn index of a 
great perceived stress, but at the same time it suggests the emergency of 
an incipient and dangerous xenophobia. The anti-Muslim crusades that 
have occurred in the country in response to pressure on the Bangladeshi 
border have the same nature. 
4 Acknowledgement to prof. Sanjoy Hazarika for the materials of the Discussion on the Situ-
ation in Assam conference, held in September at the Jamia Millia Islamia University of Delhi. 
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If we look at the theories on the ethnicity, not those that deal with the 
primordialist paradigm, but those who deal with the process of formation 
of boundaries between groups, we will see that there is a clear parallel 
with the above theories on nationalism. Fredrik Barth focused the deter-
mining process of ethnicity as the predominance of relationships within 
the group – and in turn the relationship of the group with the outside 
world – compared to the importance of transmitted real cultural contents 
(Barth 1969, pp. 9-37). In this sense, the tribal communities of India have 
experienced colonial isolationism. Conversely, after Independence, they 
have been forced towards economic development with a syncopated rhythm 
from area to area, and often without freedom to make choices. Although 
in the Northeast have been taken a gradual policy, there is a widespread 
perception that the specificities of each cultural identity were neglected in 
the general process of nation-building. Consequently those identities have 
been the pretext to create the new platforms of ethnicity. In other words, 
the communities once more flexible, conglomerating clusters of versatile 
nature, now become ethno-political blocks. Here the revival originated 
socio-political programs: is interesting in this regard the Donyi-Poloism, a 
form of purged shamanism, theoretically elected as a philosophical system, 
an ādidharma, that if on one side sees the contribution of intellectuals and 
local intelligentsia (mainly Adi) has lost the connection with the contents 
and dynamics of authentic local tribalism (Mibang, Chaudhuri 2004, pp. 35-
38, 53-62, 159-172). It’s much more serious is the embedding of the onset 
of armed groups, terrorists, who use the exacerbation of ethnicity as a tool 
towards separatism.5 It would appear that subsists more similarity between 
the processes of ethnicity and nationalism – that here fragmented, exac-
erbated, seems to take the violent connotations of what anthropologists 
defined ‘African tribalism’ – that between theories of nationalism and the 
nation itself (Jaffrelot 2003, pp. 2, 41-46). Here too, the sacred is a constant 
of human social life and the modern world is not an exception, its novelty 
lies only in the fact that the national form assumes an essentially secular 
feature. Anderson already showed that so far as sacred and secular may 
appear to be two antithetical orders, they intersect in what will become 
the key symbols of the nation: the monument, the [new] flag, etc. Yet in In-
dia, how not to think of dense debate between Gandhi and Rabindhranath 
Thakur, where the Indian Nobel-laureate warned the Mahatma about the 
dangers of nationalism and hoped the clearing of the symbols for a good 
of a higher nature? 
5 The casualties in these so called ‘low-intensity’ conflicts are more than 5000 since 2005, 
but since Independence seems to be ten times greater in number. See «Fatalities in Terrorist 
Violence in India’s Northeast 2005-2012» in South Asia Terrorism Portal. 
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4 Conclusion
The Indian Government has been many times in a jam wavering on the 
policy to be held in Northeast. Despite the mission statement of PM Man-
mohan Singh to descending at the negotiating table with the separatist 
groups, it became soon clear that to give way to a single specific instance, 
in the absence of uniform guidelines, means trigger the replication of many 
other requests. The large number of these groups and the complexity of 
the internal relations amongst them, inflamed again the resurgence of 
terrorism just after the beginning of the consultations, by virtue of the 
negotiations between the Government and a single faction among many 
rivals. In the best of cases, even in a nonviolent context, the stress and 
discomfort of tribal communities and ethnic minorities – many of which 
have faraway origins, but today are considered autochthonous compared 
to new migrants – are due largely to problems of definition of their role 
in the nation. By themselves the ādivāsī communities in the first place, 
are trying to fill a historical vacuum crystallised increasingly in modern 
times, are implementing strategies to adapt to the contemporary, but in 
this effort they feel obviously alone in front of globalization’s processes. 
Any attempt to standardisation conceivably will lead to a radicalisation 
of diversity, especially today that thanks to the power of media there is 
greater self-awareness but a larger possibility of manipulation of issues 
such as ethnicity. Then we come to the hypothesis of a possible solution 
in the reversal of the theory of Barth, or rather to privilege the cultural 
contents of the tradition of the groups as for the respect to their position 
in the social system, in order to break down boundaries and strenuous re-
sistances. Working in this way it would be possible to switch from the rigid 
characterisation of ‘ethnicity’ to the positive value of ‘cultural identity’ of 
the specific ethnic minorities. 
Until recently, the question of the origins of civilisation in India has 
proved to be of central importance. The scientific discoveries of the acad-
emy seemed to have a direct impact on policy, as the awareness of the 
origins of the subcontinent could be a paradigm of governance model 
for present and future. Today, scholars are realising that even before the 
theories on ethnicity and nationalism, the challenge for the future will be 
based on establishing the identity of the ethnic and tribal communities. I 
noted how the most conservative forces in the country are working hard to 
forcefully bring back the tribal theories to the Hindu dharma. On the other 
hand I had the impression that the Marxist structuring or at least more 
progressive positions on the issue exert at all costs to find an alien root 
for the tribal groups, as if it would be necessary to reinterpret the concept 
of a multicultural and multi-ethnic India. Here is clear that the truth lies 
somewhere in between: the investigation of origins – autochthonous, cross-
border, or sunk into oblivion – is less important at present. Since it is pos-
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sible to reconstruct it, history shows that tribal communities have always 
been able to interface with others, whether with Mughal rulers, or Hindu 
Raja, Buddhist schools, or other jatis. With them they always maintained 
an osmotic cultural relationship: exactly as the osmosis is bidirectional, re-
ciprocal, bilateral. The key is here, the maintaining fluidity in the relation-
ships through the promotion and respect for cultural identities. This can 
only be done by those who, in turn, could be described as the new pañcaśīla 
cultural identity: tribe, caste, religion, language, territory. In other words, 
respect of the ancestry’s relationship of the groups with the territory, re-
covery of traditional values, protection of culture – as reconstruction of the 
history of the region, as defence of linguistic specificity and as guarantee 
of religious freedom – goals achievable only through the enhancement and 
the right to education of young people. Finally the development of the area 
is to be thought as sustainable by the societies involved and eco-compatible 
with one of the last pristine areas of the planet. 
Only in this way the look that embraces the North-eastern India pass-
es through the śaktipīṭha of Kamakhya, the Pambari Masjid, the Tawang 
Monastery, through all the villages of ādivāsīs who live in the valleys of 
the Himalayas and the thick of its forests and ends in Parashuram Khund, 
near the border with Burma, where it is said, no by coincidence, that rises 
the sun of India. If we abstract for a moment from the borders of the maps 
and we imagine how forward the cultural influence of India have naturally 
thrust herself, we will be going over the natural boundaries, confirming 
once again the emptiness of whose Edward Said called Imagined Geogra-
phies (1999, pp. 56-60, 74-78). 
At this point it will be clear how the Chinese perspectives are absolutely 
aliens to such a context, the major riparian projects appear here only as 
a threat of environmental disaster, and the reasons behind the territorial 
claims are only a theoretical vacuum. At the same time it is interesting to 
note that China faces too in its territory centrifugal forces of various kinds: 
in addition to the issue of Tibet, there are pushes that emerges from a reli-
gious, civil, or ethnic matrix. But from the little filtered through a state of 
information’s censorship, these centrifugal forces are regularly drowned 
with the isolation and repression. For this reason, China has basically been 
called the land of a thousand revolts. It is on this premise, a weakness that 
never in history has occurred, that China intends to take possession of an 
unstable territory that never bowed to foreign domination? Or only through 
the values of Indian democracy will be possible to work on a development, 
normalization and peace project for the future? The answer is obvious. So 
far as the implications of political and economic order are complex enough 
to assume a general slowdown in the development rate of the country, 
the necessary time spent here will benefit a framework that is a testing 
ground for other set of regional problems and at the same time the key to 
the India’s future. 
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